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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DEAN ALLEN and GIFFORD ALLEN,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs-

Case No.

RADIUM KING MINES, INC., a Colorado Corporation; ULA URANIUM, INC.,
a Colorado Corporation, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

9194

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Consistent with the brief of the appellants, the
appellants Dean Allen and Gifford Allen will be referred
to as plaintiffs as they appeared in the trial court. The
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2

respondents Radium King Mines; Ula Uranium, et al.
will be referred to as the defendants as they appear in the
court below. The transcript of the proceedings at the
trial will be referred to as (T. ______ ). The record on appeal
will be referred to as (R. ------)·
The dispute concerns the validity of conflicting lode
mining claims covering land in San Juan County, Utah.
The area in conflict is covered by Fat Dog claims belonging to Radium King and Hi Boy claims belonging to the
plaintiffs. Ula has heretofore conveyed to Radium King
all of the former's operating interest in the said Fat
Dog claims subject to a one-half interest in the net
profits. The parties agree that the land involved was
open for mineral location at the time the conflicting
claims were allegedly located. Specifically the conflict
involves Fat Dog claims Nos. 4, 5, 6, and Fat Dog fractions Nos. 2 and 3 on the one hand, and Hi Boy claims
Nos. 1, 2, and 3 on the other hand.
According to the location notices for the Fat Dog
claims Nos. 4, 5, and 6, the same were staked on the
ground May 17-19, 1954, and on June 17, 1954, the location notices for the said claims were filed in the office
of the County Recorder for San Juan County.
According to the location notices for the Hi Boy
claims Nos. 1, 2, and 3, the same were staked on the
ground February 23, 1956, and on March 15, 1956, the
same were filed in the office of the County Recorder
for San Juan County.
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On May 9, 1956, Fat Dog claims Nos. 1 to 7 inclusive
were amended on the ground, and on said date Fat Dog
fractions Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were located. On May 10, 1956,
the amended location notices for Fat Dog claims Nos.
1 to 7 inclusive and location notices for Fat Dog fractional claims Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were filed in the office of the
County Recorder for San Juan County.
An affidavit filed August 26, 1957, in the office of
the County Recorder of San Juan County stated that the
amended location of Fat Dog No. 6 was in fact an original
location.
On January 14, 1959, Hi Boy claims Nos. 1, 2, and 3
were amended on the ground and on January 19, 1959,
amended notices of location of the said Hi Boy claims
were filed in the office of the County Recorder of San
Juan County.
The notice of location for Hi Boy claim No. 1 placed
in the discovery monument of said claim did not contain
the names of the locators.
In his opening statement, counsel for the plaintiffs
stated that the plaintiffs claimed the land in conflict by
virtue of their actual physical possession of the same
(T. 4). During the course of the trial, however, there was
no evidence whatsoever introduced by the plaintiffs indicating that they ever at any time had, on the contrary,
actual physical possession of the ground in conflict. The
evidence showed that it was Radium King Mines that
was in possession ( T. 378-380).
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The plaintiffs on August 23, 1957, attempted to go
on the disputed ground, but the defendants who were
then in possession of the claims prevented the plaintiffs
from so doing (T. 378-380).
Other facts which have a bearing on the issues involved are set forth in the argument.

PRELIMINARY

STATE~IENT

In this action both the plaintiffs and the defendants
are seeking to quiet title to land covered by conflicting
mining claims (R. 1-5, 27-33). The action, therefore, is
one at law. Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah (2d) 11, 327 P.
(2d) 250; Babcock v. DangerfVeld, 98 Utah 10, 94 P. (2d)
862; Buckley v. Cox, 122 Utah 151, 247 P. (2d) 277. It
therefore follows that this appeal shall be on questions
of law only, and the Supreme Court is bound by the findings of the trial court if there is any competent evidence
to support them. See Rule 72, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Buckley v. Cox, 122 Utah 151, 247 P. (2d) 277.
This latter case involved an appeal from a lower court
judgment quieting title to certain property in the plaintiff. There defendants' sole assignment of error on appeal was that the evidence was insufficient to support
the finding of the trial court. This court speaking
through Mr. Justice :McDonough repeated the criteria for
determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the findings in a quiet title action.
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"Under the criteria set out in Norback v. Board
of Directors, 84 Utah 506, 37 P.2d 339, this action
is one at law. Hence if there is any competent
evidence in the record to support the court's findings the judgment should not be disturbed. Brown
v. Union Pac. R. Co., 76 Utah 475, 290 P. 759;
Jenkins v. Stephens, 64 Utah 307, 231 P. 112. This
principle is well stated in Jensen v. Gerrard, 85
Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070, 1072:
"'As this is a law action, the question is not
whether the evidence would have supported
the decision in favor of the appellants, but
whether the decision made by the trial court
finds support in the evidence. If there is
competent credible evidence to support the
findings made by the trial court, then those
findings should stand.' "
The same results would obtain even if this were an
ejectment action as claimed by the plaintiffs on page 8
of their brief. Robinson v. Thomas, 75 Utah 446, 453, 286
P. 625.
In any event, however, the findings of the trial court
are overwhelmingly supported in the record of the case.
Contrary to the statement of the plaintiffs on page 8
of their brief this quiet title suit is precisely the situation
where the plaintiffs must rely on the strength of their
own title rather than on any weakness of the defendants'
title.
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74 C.J.S., Quieting Title, Sec.17(b):
"As a general rule, one seeking to quiet title or
remove a cloud thereon must succeed on the
strength of his own title and not on the weakness
of his adversary's title, and want of title in plaintiff ordinarily renders it unnecessary to examine
that of defendant."
Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 Utah 10, 94 P. (2d) 862:
"While it is true that in an action to quiet title
the plaintiff must succeed by virtue of the
strength of his own title rather than the weakness
of defendant's title, nevertheless all the plaintiff
need do is to prove prima facie that he has title
which, if not overcome by defendant, is sufficient."
(Gases cited)
Likewise see the case of Honte Owners' Loan Co"fporation v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 P. (2d) 160, a quiet
title action. The court said:
"Plaintiff could prevail on a claim of record
title only by showing good title in itself, not by
showing some defects in the title of defendant."
Also see Kanab Urantum Corp. v. Consolidated
Uranium Mines, 227 F. (2d) 434 (C.C.A.-10, 1955)
". . . it is the law without exception that in all
actions to recover possession of land or an interest therein one must prevail upon the strength of
his own title and not on the weakness of his adversary's title." ('Cases cited.)
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POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NEVER HAD ANY POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED PREMISES-LAWFUL, PEACEFUL, OR OTHERWISE.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFFS' HI BOY CLAIMS ARE INVALID AND
ARE INFERIOR TO ANY CLAIMS OF DEFENDANTS.
(A)

FINDING NO. 14 IS ADEQUA'TELY SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.

(B)

FINDING NO. 13 IS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
POINT III.

THE FAT DOG CLAIMS WERE VALIDLY LOCATED
PRIOR IN TIME TO ANY HI BOY CLAIMS AND THE
PLAINTIFFS ARE IN NO ·POSITION 'TO ATTACK THE
VALIDITY OF THE FAT DOG FRACTIONAL CLAIMS NOS.
2 AND 3 AND FAT DOG NO.6 CLAIM.
POINT IV.
OTHER DEFECTS IN THE ATTEMPTED LOCATION
OF THE HI BOY CLAIMS.
(A)

THE DISCOVERY MONUMENTS ERECTED FOR
THE HI BOY CLAIMS WERE INVALID.

(B)

THE LOCA'TION NOTICES COVERING THE HI
BOY CLAIMS FILED FOR RECORD IN THE
OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF SAN
JUAN COUNTY ARE INVALID.

(C)

THE LOCATORS OF THE HI BOY CLAIMS
NEVER MADE A DISCOVERY OF MINERAL
IN PLACE ON THE PREMISES COVERED BY
THE SAID CLAIMS.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NEVER HAD ANY POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED PREMISES-LAWFUL, PEACEFUL, OR OTHERWISE.

The claim on the part of the plaintiffs on page 9
of their brief that they were in "continuous, notorious
possession of the property in August of 1957, the month
in which they were ousted, and in the month preceding"
is simply not true. Such a claim has no basis whatsoever
in the record. The plaintiffs say that possession cannot
be questioned and cite the following pages on page 9
of their brief (T. 35-38, 145-147, 175). The court's attention is invited to all of the testimony appearing on
those pages and in addition the testimony on pages 178
and 179 where it is at once evident that the plaintiffs
were entirely out of possession of the disputed premises.
The testimony on pages 35, 36 and 37 of the transcript indicates only that the Aliens were making some
arrangements for work to be done in the area; they dealt
with one Allenbach (T. 36); they only camped close to
the property ( T. 36) ; while they went on the Hi Boy
claims (T. 37), nothing indicates where on the claims
they went. Allen said an engineer was on the ground
and used instruments (T. 37). A bulldozer was headed
for the area (T. 38). A road was started up the mountain
towards the claim (T. 38). But certainly none of the
foregoing testimony indicates any possession on the part
of the Aliens. At most the testimony only suggested the
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anticipations of the plaintiffs. As a matter of fact the
plaintiffs' bulldozer was stopped by Radium King when
it approached the Fat Dog claims (T. 40). Radium King,
not the Aliens was in possession! Radium King in defense of its title and possession wouldn't let the Aliens
trespass on the property. If the court has any doubt
about who was in possession it is invited to look at pages
39, 40, 41, and 42 of the transcript.

The camp of the Allenbachs, with which persons
the plaintiffs had had some dealings and through whom
the plaintiffs apparently claim to be in possession of the
area in conflict, were never on the claims. Dean Allen on
cross-examination admitted that they, the Allenbachs,
only camped close to the premises ( T. 77). When pressed
further he admitted they were camping more than a half
mile away (T. 95). On further cross-examination he
stated that the plaintiffs never got any equipment on the
Hi Boy claims at all (T. 94). The only equipment on
the claims was that which would have been carried personally by the plaintiffs in their pockets or in their packs
(T. 94). The plaintiffs never had a camp site or put a
camp down on the claims (T. 94).

Both Duncan E. Harrison and Arthur E. Flint testified as to the work and labor being done by Radium King
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10
on and for the benefit of the premises in conflict. Harrison indicated the extent of the Radium King activity on
the claims (R. 376-377). Flint in his testimony amplified the statements of Harrison and pointed out the extent to which Radium King men and equipment were on
the Fat Dog claims (R. 407-409).
The plaintiffs made some point of an incident that
occurred on the Fat Dog claims when the defendant,
Radium King, prevented the plaintiffs from moving onto
the Fat Dog claims ( T. 178). This only bears out the
contention of Radium King that it was Radium King, not
the Aliens, that was in possession of the ground in dispute. Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention the Aliens
were out of possession. They were prevented from trespassing on the Fat Dog claims.
The whole situation appears to be a design on the
part of the plaintiffs to claim ground already occupied by
defendants, after guessing that the ground lies on the
extension of a channel on which Radium King presently
has a producing mine. Radium King has spent $25,000.00
for the benefit of the ground in question (T. 4-7); has
actually drilled it. The plaintiffs haven't spent anything
except a little time and the cost of a couple of surveys,
the first of which was objectionable to the plaintiffs
and was not finished.
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Certainly fron1 the foregoing evidence the trial court
was justified in failing to find that the plaintiffs were
in possession of the disputed area under such circumstances as to give them a claim to the same.

We have read the five cases cited by the plaintiffs
on this issue. None contain facts similar to the instant
case to the extent there is any factual resemblance. They
only strengthen the position of Radium King Mines
rather than help the Aliens. We have no quarrel with
the law as stated in any of the cited cases.

In the case of Atherley v. Bulli on M anarch Uranium
1

Company, 8 Utah (2d) 362, 335 P. (2d) 71, there was
no dispute about possession. The plaintiff knew at the
time he located his claim that the defendant was in
posession of the area in dispute through its lessee and
was and had been conducting mining operations thereon
for a few years previously. Nearly all of the mining
operations on the particular claim involved were conducted on the area in conflict. Over a three year period
there had been removed some 10,000 tons of ore from
the area that was in dispute. It was estimated that
some $300,000.00 had been expended by the defendant,
its lessee and contractors developing the conflict area.
In that case this court noted :
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"The only issue on this appeal is whether
or not a mining locator, with full knowledge of
the claim of a prior claimant, 1nay deliberately
stake over the boundaries of said prior claimant
while the latter is in possession and mining the
property claimed, and assert the invalidity of
the prior claim, on the sole ground that a few
years before the prior claimant had relocated his
claim without filing of record an amended location certificate."

Eilers v. Boatman, 3 Utah 159, 167, 2 P. 66, 72,
affirmed 111 U. S. 356, 357, 4 S. Ct. 432, 28 L. Ed.
454, unlike the instant case, involved a secret underground trespass by a third party which the court held
did not effect the rights of either party to the action
and as between the litigants, it was an undisputed fact
that the respondents were in actual possession of the
area in dispute, sinking their incline shaft and occupying a shanty on the ground.

Inman v. Ollson, 321 P. (2d) 1043 (Ore. 1958) involved an action by the plaintiffs to eject the defendants
as trespassers on four mining locations made by the
plaintiffs. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' evidence,
the trial court granted an involuntary non-suit. The
plaintiffs had gone on the ground in question and had
staked out four mining claims and posted notices as
required by law, and thereafter in compliance with
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the applicable statutory provisions, they established the
boundaries of the claims on the ground. In the meantime
efforts were made to have discovery work completed.
Also in the meantime the defendant came upon the
premises and overstaked the claims of the plaintiffs
and claimed the land in dispute and posted signs warning trespassers that they would be prosecuted. Held:
Unless abandoned prior to the expiration of the 60-day
period, there could be no valid relocation of the same
ground made by any third parties during the intervening 60-day period. Whether the plaintiffs had validly
located the claim was a question of fact for the jury
to consider.

Kanab Uranium Corp. v. Consolvdated u~anium
Mines, 227 F. (2d) 434 (C.C.A.-10, 1955) is also cited
by the plaintiffs. There the plaintiffs were oil and gas
lease owners who did not have any title to mining
claims and claimed the right as general citizens to
go upon the land occupied by the defendants under
color of title and there explore for uranium. The plaintiffs sought to have the defendants restrained from
interfering with their so going upon the claims, alleging
that the right of possession and title of the defendants
to their mining claims were in fact void. In holding
that the complaint was properly dismissed by the trial
court, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit said:
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"It seems clear from the face of the complaint that appellee was in possession of the
premises under color of title, of which fact appellants had full knowledge, and the title was
being asserted by appellee in defense of its po
session.

"It follows, therefore, that since appellants
have no title to a mining claim and assert only
the right to go upon the premises .to explore
for minerals they are in no position to attack
the validity of appellee's title to its mining claims,
because it is the law without exception that in
all actions to recover possession of land or an
interest therein one must prevail upon the
strength of his own title and not on the weakness
of his adversary's title.
"While some of the cases say that possession
may be maintained only by 'continued actual
occupancy by a qualified locator or his representatives engaged in persistent and diligent
prosecution of work looking to the discovery of
mineral,' they hold that 'As against a mere intruder, the possession of a mining claim by a
locator who has complied with the law is of itself sufficient to prevent the intruder, even upon
a peaceable entry, from acquiring a right of
possession.' The right as general citizens which
appellants assert to go upon premises occupied
by another under color of title, even though
defective, is not right of title entitling them
to maintain this action."
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The Aliens in the instant case are 1n much the
same position as the appellants in the Kanab Uranium
case. The predecessors in title of Radium King Mines
were the prior locators of the claims. Radium King
was, in fact, in possession of the disputed ground and
prevented the plaintiffs from trespassing thereon.

The weakness of the plaintiffs' title in the instant
case was so obvious that it is understandable why the
plaintiffs in their brief would seek to havP ~!1~:::1 cuu1 t
believe that in spite of that weakness, they can recover
on some nebulous theory of possession or right of
possession. Kanab Uranium, however, makes it clear
that the Aliens must recover on the strength of their
own title and the facts show that they had neither
pos~P.Rsion nor title by which they could prevail in this
action.

In Adams v. Benedict, 327 P. (2d) · 308 (New
Mexico, 1958) the plaintiffs had marked the location
of their claims, posted notices thereon, and filed copies
with the county clerk, but had not drilled a discovery
hole exposing mineral in place within ninety days as
required by statute. At the time the defendants entered
the disputed ground, the plaintiffs were not and had
not been engaged in persistent and diligent prosecution
of work looking to the discovery of mineral, nor had
they been in actual, continued possession of the ground.
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The defendants entered peaceably upon the ground in
question and took actual possession thereof. They moved
a large drilling rig onto the premises; thereafter the
plaintiffs forceably entered upon the premises against
vigorous opposition. On such facts the New Mexico Court
reached the only logical conclusion that could be reached
- that the plaintiffs had not perfected their claim
and had no rights in the purported location, and the
defendants having peaceably entered upon the ground
and taken actual possession thereof were entitled to a
possessory right of the claim in question. The distinction
between the instant case and Adams vs. Benedict as
far as the plaintiffs are concerned is obvious. It is
the plaintiffs' position and not the defendants' position
in Adams vs. Benedict that corresponds to the position
of the plaintiffs in the instant case.

One thing is clear in the case at bar and that is
that it was Radium King Mines, and not the Allen
brothers, that was in actual possession of the disputed
premises. The Allen brothers were out of possession.
They were denied entry upon the claims. Neither were
they forceably dispossessed. Therefore, the Allen brothers, being out of possession, if they are to prevail in
this case, must show under smne valid title of their
own, a right to the possession of the claims. This they
did not do. The evidence introduced at the trial of the
case and noted above demonstrates that Radium King
Mines and its predecessors in title were the original
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locators of the claims. The Fat Dog claims were located
in the months of May and June of 1954. The overlapping Hi Boy claims were not staked, if they were
ever staked on the ground, until 1956. In other words,
Radium King Mines and its predecessors in title were
the prior locators of the ground; had made a valid
discovery th~reon and were in actu~ possession of
the claims. Nearly $25,000.00 have been spent in development work by the defendants (407). This is simply
a case of the plaintiffs who were subsequent in time
and out of possession looking for some way to muscle
in on the defendants.

There was certainly sufficient evidence to justify
the trial court in finding :

"The Fat Dog claims have been rn the
defendants' and their predecessor in interest
possession since their original location. (Memorandum Decision, R. 55)

POINT II.

PLAINTIFFS' HI BOY CLAIMS ARE INVALID AND
ARE INFERIOR TO ANY CLAIMS OF DEFENDANTS.

(A)

FINDING NO~ 14 IS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
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Finding No. 14 made by trial court reads as follows
(R. 59):

"14. The boundaries of said Hi Boy claims,
Nos. 1, 2, and 3, were not distinctly marked on
the ground so that the boundaries could readily
be traced."
Section 40-1-3 U.C.A. 1953, provides as follows:
"Mining claims and mill sites must be distinctly marked on the ground so that the boundaries thereof can be readily traced."
Not until the time of trial were the defendants able
to determine precisely what ground the plaintiffs claim
we-re included in their Hi Boy claiins. When John
Shepherd surveyed the area in May, 1956, he observed
several scattered Hi Boy monuments which were located on the plat later prepared from his survey notes.
(See defendants' Exhibit No. 10.) On his plat he showed
the Fat Dog and Fat Dog fractional claims. He also
showed the Hi Boy monuments that he observed.
From the Hi Boy corners he observed during his
survey, it is quite obvious that the boundaries of the
Hi Boy claims could not readily be traced, as required
by Section 40-1-3 U.C.A., 1953. For instance, two Southeast corner monuments for Hi Boy No. 3 are noted in
the vicinity of Fat Dog No. 6. Similarly one can observe
two Northeast corner monuments for Hi Boy No. 2
claim. In one case the Southeast corner of Hi Boy No. 3
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is common to the Northeast corner of Hi Boy No. 2.
In the other case it is not. (Exhibit 10)

Connecting the respective corners with dotted lines
as shown on Shepherd's plat, Exhibit No. 10, it appears
that the Hi Boy Nos. 2 and 3 claims were nearly perpendicular to the Wingate scarp or cliff. Then complete'Iy inconsistent with any location lying perpendicular
to the Wingate escarpment, J\fr. Shepherd, in the course
of his survey, found other Hi Boy corners on the
Fat Dog No. 3 claim. He found a Southwest corner
and Northeast corner of Hi Boy No. 1 claim. However,
up towards the top of defendants' Exhibit 10 is shown
the Northeast corner of Hi Boy No. 1 claim, and in
the latter case it is common to the Southwest corner
of Hi Boy No. 2.

How can anyone be expected to trace any Hi Boy
claims readily from such

monuments~

There appears

to be a floating or swinging of the Hi Boy claims. It
would appear that if the claims were ever located on
the ground, they were first located perpendicular to
the wingate scarp and then later floated or rotated
nearly 90°. North of the upper end of Fat Dog No. 5
can be observed a NW corner of Hi Boy No.1 common
to the SW corner of Hi Boy· No. 2. Nearby is to be
observed the west and center of Hi Boy No. 1, the
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source being common to the SE corner of Hi Boy No.
6. But look in the Fat Dog No. 3 claims and what do
you see~ The NW corner of Hi Boy No. 1, west and
center of Hi Boy No. 1 and SW corner of Hi Boy No. 1,
and none of the latter corners are common to Hi Boy
6 corner. How could the defendants or anyone else be
expected to trace the boundaries of Hi Boy claims 1
Up until 1956 there was no sign of a Hi Boy claim
in the area, then Hi Boy corners suddenly began to
appear all over the area occupied by the Fat Dog claims.

Then just before trial the plaintiffs came up with
"L" shaped claims as shown in red tracing on Exhibit
No. 10. Such a contention on the part of plaintiffs is
novel to say the least. Surely such a contention should
tax the credulity of this or any other court. The location notices for the Hi Boy claims, Exhibits D, E,
and F clearly show that there was no intention whatsoever to locate any "L"-shaped claim. The dimensions
set forth in the notices are such that the claims, if they
corresponded at all to the description set forth in
the notice, would have to be in the shape of a rectangle or parallelogram. There are no indications at
all of any angular side lines.
During the course of preparing for trial and pursuant to the demand of defendants the plaintiffs produced Exhibit No. 17. The claims shown in the upper
left hand portion of Exhibit 17 show the Fat Dog and
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Hi Boy claims. Note that the Hi Boy claims are shown
to lie in an east and west direction. The east-west direction corresponds to their lower position of the Hi Boy
claim shown in Exhibit No. 10. At least the east west
position of the Hi Boy corresponds to the claims as shown
on defendants' Exhibit No. 12 which was introduced at
the deposition of Dean Allen as Exhibit "B." An examination of Exhibit No. 12 shows the Hi Boy claims in
rectangular manner cutting across the Fat Dog claims.
The relative position of Fat Dog and Hi Boy claims were
claimed by Gifford Allen to be as shown on Exhibit No.
12.

In addition, Nate Knight, who was to fly the claims
was given a rough sketch of the same by the Aliens, and
their relationship to the Wingate scarp is shown on defendants' Exhibit No. 18. The pencil sketch was prepared
at the deposition of Nate Knight and there introduced as
defendants' Exhibit No. 1.

In none of the discovery proceedings prior to trial,
nor in any of the dealings between the parties was it
ever indicated to the defendants that the plaintiffs contended that their claims were "L"-shaped. Paul Allen
in testifying at the trial seemed to suggest that at the
time the depositions were taken in December, 1959, he
knew the claims were "L"-shaped (T. 255). Suffice it
to say, that if he and his brothers did then know the
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claims were "L"-shaped, they kept the information well
concealed. It is doubtful that the Hi Boy claims were
ever actually located on the ground as early as 1956.
When corners were placed on the ground either the plaintiffs didn't know what they were doing or they were attempting to swing or float the claims as appear from the
corners surveyed in by John Shepherd. From the time
of the deposition in December, 1956 to just before trial
it appeared the plaintiffs had settled on an east-west
position for their claims. See Exhibit No. 12. Now they
are "L"-shaped. The plaintiffs cannot reconcile this with
the statutory requirement of Section 40-1-3. The whole
purpose of stating a claim is to let it be known exactly
what ground is claimed.

Mr. Newell, who surveyed the Hi Boy claims, stated
that he had not been on the ground prior to making his
survey in December, 1958 and January, 1959. He never
saw any of the original monuments; he relied only on
self-serving statements of the Aliens that he was surveying in the original corner monuments of the Hi Boy
claims. As a 1natter of fact the Aliens themselves didn't
know what the Hi Boy claims looked like. Dean Allen
said (T. 76) :

"Q.

A.

When you staked out the claims originally,
you certainly didn't have that-the shape of
those claims in mind, did you?
We didn't have that in mind, no.
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Q.

Neither did you stake these L-shaped claims
at that time, did you 1

A.

We didn't know what they were going to look
like, no.

Q. Did they look like
A. vVhen we staked

that~

them~

Q. Yes.
A. We didn't know that they would look like
that. There was no way of telling what they
would look like.

Q.

So you couldn't tell when you staked these
claims what they would look like, could you~

A.

Not at that time.

Q. Neither could anybody

else~

A.

Unless they was-would survey them, they
could tell.

Q.

That's the only way they could tell~

A.

Oh, they could have used a Brunton compass
of some kind, I guess, and got an idea.

Q. You, yourself, didn't know what shape they
were~

A. At that time we didn't know the shape."
Gifford Allen's testimony showed also that he, as
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-one of the locators, did not know how the claims were
shaped (T. 226) :

"Q.

When did you find out that these claims were
L-shaped ~

A.

We first knew that when Morrill's men were
there. I was below and Dean and the two
instrument men were above, and one man was
going to shoot down and draw me in, and I
was going to stand at the corner, and he would
spot those, but they were up and waiting;
they hollered do\vn; would have to come up
there or something, and the claims ran off
this way, (indicating) and so I climbed up. I
did not go up that time. I didn't go up where
the road comes. I went over a ways and up
through, and finally I was able to make it.
They had to come down and reach me. I had
a hard time of it. I didn't want to walk over
that far.

Q.

Until that time, you thought these claims were
turned around~

A.

That time we assumed they came over the
Wingate in the manner that I have drawn.

Q.

And were approximately

A.

What is

that~

Q. And were approximately
A.

rectangular~

rectangular~

And were-yes."
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How could anyone be in a position to readily trace
the Hi Boy monuments when even the Aliens didn't know
what their claims looked like, and when at the time the
case went to trial there were three sets of originals on the
ground as admitted by Paul Allen (T. 255) ~

"Q. As a matter of fact, there are three sets now
of monuments aren't there-the originals~
A.

I suppose.

Q.

What~

A.

I guess so, yes."

Neither did Paul know that the claims they located
were "L"-shaped (T. 255):

"Q. vVhen did you first find out that the original
claims were L-shaped ~
A.

It was about the time we took those depositions or just after that; in there sometime.

Q. It was in December of 1957 ~,
A.

I believe so.

Q. Or after
A.

that~

Probably around in there sometime."

If not one of the locators knew the shape of the
claims, how could the public be expected to know~ The
statutory requirement was not satisfied.

(B)

FINDING NO. 13 IS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
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Finding No. 13 made by the trial court reads as follows:
"13. The original notice of location for Hi
Boy No. 1 claim did not contain the name of the
locator or locators as required by Section 40-1-2,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953."
Defendants' Exhibit No. 14 is a photograph of the
notice ( T. 59). However, on cross-examination, Clifford
Allen reluctantly testified that the notice was signed
approximately the middle of September, 1957, and when
pressed further stated that he might not dispute testimony that it was signed after November, 1957 (T. 213).
The lack of any names of locators on the location notice is in itself fatal to the validity of Hi Boy No. 1.
Section 40-1-2 U.C.A., 1953 specifically provides that the
locator at the time of making the discovery must erect a
monument at the place of discovery and post thereon his
notice of location which shall contain among other information specified, the names of the locator or locators.
See also title 30, Section 28 U.S.C.A. The case of Jose
v. Houck, 171 F. (2d) 211 (CCA-9, 1948) dealt with the
precise problem and held the absence of the names of
locators on a location notice to be fatal to those claiming
under it:
". . . a close scrutiny of one of the posted notices
of the Hammond Associates-the only exemplar
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introduced in evidence-fails to disclose thA names
of the locators. It seems rather more than probable that the absence of the names from the exhibit is not traceable to erasures or weathering,
but to oversight. The law requires that the names
of the locators be stated in the notice. 30 TT.S.C.A.
Sec. 28."
POINT III.
THE FAT DOG CLAIMS WERE VALIDLY LOCATED
PRIOR IN TIME TO ANY HI BOY CLAIMS AND THE
PLAINTIFFS ARE IN NO POSITION 'TO ATTA.CK THE
VALIDITY OF THE FAT DOG FRACTIONAL CLAIMS NOS.
2 AND 3 AND FAT DOG NO.6 CLAIM.

As already pointed out the conflict in this lawsuit
involves Fat Dog claims Nos. 4, 5, and 6 and Fat Dog
Fractional claims Nos. 2 and 3 on the one hand and Hi
Boy claims Nos. 1, 2, and 3 on the other hand ( T. 4).
The Fat Dog claims Nos. 4, 5, and 6 were staked on
the ground :May 17-19, 1954, and on June 17, 1954, the location notices for the said claims were filed in the office
of the County Recorder for San Juan County.
According to the location notices for the Hi Boy
claims No. 1, 2, and 3, the same were supposedly staked
on the ground February 23, 1956, and on March 15, 1956,
the same were filed in the office of the County Recorder
for San Juan County.
On May 9, 1956, Fat Dog claims Nos. 1 to 7 inclusive
were amended on the ground and on said date Fat Dog
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Fractions Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were located. On May 10, 1956,
the amended location notices for Fat Dog claims Nos. 1
to 7 inclusive and location notices for Fat Dog Fractional
claims Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were filed in the office of the
County Recorder for San Juan ·County.
An affidavit filed August 26, 1957, in the office of the
County Recorder of San Juan County stated that the
amended location of Fat Dog No. 6 was in fact an original
location. The defendants make no claim of a priority
date for said claim earlier than May, 1956, the date when
John Shepherd amended the Fat Dog claims on the
ground and located the fractional claims.
On January 14, 1959, Hi Boy claims Nos. 1, 2, and
3 were purportedly amended on the ground and on J anuary 19, 1959, amended notices of location of said Hi Boy
claims were filed in the office of the County Recorder
of San Juan County.
Apparently in Point No. III of their brief the plaintiffs are attacking the validity of the amendments made
by John Shepherd in May, 1956, resulting in the location
of the above mentioned Fat Dog Fractional claims and
Fat Dog No. 6 claim. The plaintiffs apparently contend
that said claims are invalid for want of a discovery of
mineral.
It might be noted in passing that while the defendants amended their claims back in 1956, the plaintiffs,
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were atternpting to amend their Hi Boy Claims in J anuary, 1959, just a few weeks prior to the trial of the case.
The amending of mining claims is a well recognized
practice. The locators of mining claims, who frequently
are practical miners and not equipped with elaborate
surveying equipment nor trained to use the same, have
never been expected to go on the ground and locate
claims in the precise dimensions as allowed by law. Therefore, after they have located their claims, if it should be
discovered that any of them do not conform to statutory
standards, then in conformity with well recognized mining practice the locator may make necessary adjustments
in his claims. He may reduce their size to appropriate
dimensions, and the excess area may be staked as fractional claims.
This is precisely what was done with respect to the
Fat Dog claims and apparently what the plaintiffs were
vainly attempting to do to the Hi Boy claims just a few
weeks before the trial.
Kenneth L. Franzen testified as to how he and his
wife had staked out the Fat Dog claims (T. 315-323).
John C. Shepherd of Grand Junction, Colorado was employed to survey the Fat Dog claims as originally located
by Franzen. Shepherd is an engineer and land surveyor
(T. 258). At the trial his qualifications were conceded by
counsel for the plaintiffs (T. 258). He prepared the plat
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from which Exhibit "10" was made (T. 259). He described how Exhibit "10" was a "blown up" reproduction
of the plat he had prepared (T. 279). He stated that he
went to the area in question in l\1ay of 1956 and found
the discovery monuments for Fat Dog No. 1 claim (T.
260); in fact he found all of the discovery monuments for
Fat Dog claims Nos. 1 through 5 with the original location notices in them ( T. 261). He described the system of
coordinates that he had set up to handle the survey of the
area (T. 261), and stated that his survey of the Fat Dog
claims closed within a foot and a half around the entire
six claims (T. 262), which leaves no doubt as to the accuracy of his survey. He described in detail how he surveyed the Fat Dog ·Claims; made them conform to statutory standards ; and in so doing located the Fat Dog
Fractional claims (T. 262, 265-268, 272, 273, 290, 291, 295).
But, the plaintiffs complain that there was a lack of
discovery on the fractional claims and Fat Dog No. 6
thus located by Shepherd. So far as the plaintiffs are
concerned, however, the plain and simple answer to their
contention is-so what! The plaintiffs having no title,
possession, or right to possession are in no position to
rely on any defect, if there be such, in the location of the
defendants' claims. As already pointed out, they have no
possession or right thereto and must recover on the
strength of their own title of which they have none.
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POINT IV.
OTHER DEFECTS IN THE ATTEMPTED LOCATION
OF THE HI BOY CLAIMS.
(A)

THE DISCOVERY MONUMENTS ERECTED FOR
THE HI BOY CLAIMS WERE INVALID.

Even the discovery monuments for the Hi Boy claims
were improper. Gifford Allen admitted that they had no
discovery at the point where the monuments were ere-cted
on top of the Wingate cliff (T.192-193).

"Q. You mentioned too that ordinarily, in fact,
always, isn't that true, until you laid out Hi
Boys 1, 2, and 3, you put the discovery monuments at the end of the claim. That is true, is
it not~
A.

I believe that is pretty much accurate. There
could be some-another case. But most all
cases all our claims ever staked will lay in
that form. Maybe fifty foot-two feet, but on
one side.

Q. But in this case, because you wanted to go
half over the escarpment and half on the
Wingate, you placed the discovery monuments in the center of the claims~
A.

Location, yes, in the center.

Q. You said, "location." You corrected me. I
called it a "discovery monument." Was it a
discovery monument~
A.

Location monument. Some call it discovery
monument; some location; I call it both.
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Q.

Was this a discovery monument in each case1

A.

I don't believe there was any ore discovered
at that monument. No, I don't believe we did
-ever found anything there at that monument."

As a matter of fact there was evidence sufficient to
have persuaded the court to believe that the plaintiffs
had never in fact located the Hi-Boy claims as claimed
at the trial. John Shepherd testified that he had been
along the escarp1nent of the huge Wingate cliff about
ten times prior to the year 1957 in search of monuments
but never saw Hi Boy monuments until November 25,
1957 ( T. 281), though according to the location notices
for the Hi Boy claims they had been staked on the ground
on February 23, 1956. Dean Allen testified that the
monuments were placed very conspicuously along where
one would walk on top of the Wingate cliff (T. 258).
Nevertheless John Shepherd who had frequently been on
top of the cliff never saw them there until November 25,
1957 (T. 281). When finally the monun1ents did show up,
Arthur Flint stated that they were located close to the
rim along which might be considered a natural walkway.
They were then readily observable. He first saw them
August 25, 1957, but contrary to the information contained in the location notices they were not on the ground
in the year 1956-the year they were supposed to have
been erected (T. 405). Upon examining the notices contained in the monuments in 1957, it appeared to him that
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the same were much fresher than the paper in corresponding Fat Dog discovery monuments that had been
placed therein approximately a year earlier. He could
still see indentations on the ground adjacent to the Hi
Boy monument where fragments of rock had been picked
up to construct the monument although they were supposed to have been erected nearly a year earlier (T. 406).

(B)

THE LOCA'TION NOTICES COVERING THE HI
BOY CLAIMS FILED FOR RECORD IN THE
OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF SAN
JUAN COUNTY ARE INVALID.

Section 40-1-2 U.C.A. provides that the location
notice to be prepared by the locator and posted on the
discovery monuments shall contain among other items
of information the following:
" ( 4) If a lode claim, the number of linear feet
claimed in length along the course of the vein each
way from the point of discovery, with the width
claimed on each side of the center of the vein, and
the general course of the vein or lode as near as
may be, and such a-description of the claim,
located by a reference to some natural object or
permanent mon~tment, as will identify the claim."
(emphasis added)
Section 40-1-4, U.C.A., 1953 provides that within 30
days after the date of posting the location notice upon
the claim, the locator or locators must file for record in
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the office of the County Recorder of the County in which
such claim is situated a substantial copy of such notice
of location.

It is fundamental that the description of the whereabouts of the claim in the notice thereof must be a description which would enable a person of reasonable intelligence to find the claim and trace its boundaries. See
Vol. 2, Lindley on Mines (3rd Ed.) Sec. 381; Morrison's
Mining Rights (16th Ed.) page 86; 58 C.J.S., Mtnes and
Mimer.als, Sec. 51, page 105.

The case of Levervdge v. Hennessy, 135 P. 906
(Mont., 1913) deals with this precise question and involves facts very similar to the case at bar. The case
involved the validity of a claim knovvn as the Speculator.
The tracing on the following page is taken from page 907
of the opinion :

The appellant contended that:
". . . if the markings of the Speculator as now
claimed by the respondents are the original markings upon the ground, then the location was void
ab initio because of a substantial departure from
the calls of the declaratory statement. The subjoined drawing will illustrate the situation; the
representing the point of discovery; the double

+
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line representing the Speculator as now claimed
by the respondents; the single line representing
the Speculator as originally marked upon the
ground, according to appellants; and the broken
line representing the claim as it would appear if
in literal conformity to the calls of the declaratory
statement."

"Whether the location of the Speculator wa:3
void must be determined by the only criterion
upon which it is assailed, viz., a fatal divergence
between the declaratory statement as filed and
the markings of the claim upon the ground."

The court discussed at length the question involving
the degree of accuracy required by the applicable statute
in describing the claim in the location certificate.

"Such a statute, it is true, does not require
that the declaratory statement contain a description by metes and bonds (Upton v. Larkin, 7 !:font.
449, 17 Pac. 728; Gmner v. Glenn, 8 Mont. 371, 20
Pac. 654), but it does require that, taking the discovery as the initial point, the boundaries be
so definite and certain as that they can be readily
traced (Hauswirth v. Butcher, 4 Mont. 299, 1 Pac.
714), and that the declaratory statement contain
directions which, taken with the markings, will
enable a person of reasonable intelligence to find
the claim and runs its lines (1 Lindley on Mines,
Sec. 381; Gamer v. Glenn, supra; Bramlett v.
Flick, 23 Mont. 95, 57 Pac. 869). While neither
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mathematical precision as to measurements nor
technical accuracy of expression is expected, the
degree of accuracy that is required is indicated
by the fact that the locator after his discovery
had 30 days in which to definitely ascertain the
course of the vein and mark his boundaries and
30 days more in which to file his declaratory statement describing his claim so that it could be identified. Sanders v. Noble, 22 Mont. 110, 55 Pac.
1037. That degree of accuracy is not met if the
description given is so erroneous as to be delusive
and misleading, as when the declaratory statement
and the markings upon the ground do not even
approximately agree as to the general shape of
the claim or as to any point, direction, or distance.
Dillon v. Bayliss, 11 Mont. 171, 27 Pac. 725."

The court then discussed the discrepancy existing
between the description of the Speculator claim as set
forth in the location certificate and as claimed on the
ground at the time of the trial, and then employing
reasoning squarely in point, said,

"While the sufficiency of the description is
essentially a question of fact for the jury or for
the court sitting without a jury (Bramlett v.
Flick, supra), and while no stress is or can be
laid upon the mere departure of the lines from the
cardinal directions since the tract is northerly
and southerly, yet the description given in the
declaratory statement does suggest that the claim
is a parallelogram, all of the angles of which are
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right angles, and hence that one starting from the
point of discovery and finding the northern corners might, by proceeding at right angles to the
northern line, follow the other lines and pick up
the other corners. As a matter of fact, if he did so
proceed he would miss the southeast corner by
over 800 feet. Furthermore, the record discloses
that the southerly portion of the claim lies in timber through which the lines were not 'swamped';
that the south line is over 100 feet further from
the point of discovery and over 432 feet shorter
than called for; and that the claim as laid out in
no wise resembles what the declaratory statement
suggests. In view of all this it is a rational inference that some difficulty might be expected
in any attempt to find the lines and corners with
the aid of the declaratory statement, and the
record shows that as a matter of fact difficulty
was met, and doubt may be entertained as to
whether it was wholly surmounted even with the
aid of the locator who placed the corners. No
libe_rality of construction will avail to overcome
such a condition."

The court's attention is invited to the Utah case of
Darger v. LeSi,eur, 8 Utah 160, 30 P. 363 (1892), wherein
the Supreme Court of this state held a location certificate
insufficient where it failed properly to identify the clain1
on the ground.

If the description of the Speculator claim was faulty,
how much more fatal is the description of the Hi Boy
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claims in this case. Hi Boy monuments were scattered
all over. The Aliens themselves didn't even know where
the claims lay and nothing whatsoever would indicate to
any interested person that the claims were "L"-shaped.
Examination of Exhibit No. 10-D and the location notices
for the Hi Boy claims shows a far greater discrepancy
between the Hi Boy notices and the land actually claimed
by the Aliens than was the case in Leveridge v. Hennessy
supra.

An examination of plaintiffs' Exhibits D, E, and
F, the notices of location show that the respective Hi Boy
claims were described as being situated as follows:

"This claim lies approximately 1 mile Northerly of Ula Camp in Red Canyon on top of Wingate ... "

Dean Allen testified on direct examination that the
Hi Boy claims were located "in Red Canyon of San Juan
County, Utah" (T.12). However, upon cross-examination
he stated that Red Canyon actually dropped off some
four miles or so away from where the claims were located.
An examination of Exhibit "C," a topographic map introduced by the plaintiffs themselves, shows that the
Hi Boy clatms are not even in Red Canyon. Furthermore,
the claims were described as being "on top of (the)
vVingate." The Wingate is a very prominent cliff forma-
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tion several hundred feet high as shown in defendants'
Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11. Any description of claims
as lying on top of the Wingate would not lead a reasonable person to conclude that the claims were anywhere
else than "on top" of the cliff itself. The plaintiffs have
come into court contending that their claims are both
on top of and below the cliff formation. The locators
had a statutory duty to describe in their location notices
where the claims were located. Having described them
as being on top of the Wingate when the vVingate formation is as prominent as it is precludes them from claiming
that they are elsewhere. Certainly when they arranged
for Nate Knight to fly over the claims, they themselves
recognized that if he were to fly at all in the vicinity of
the claims, it would be necessary to describe them as
being about 750 feet on top and 750 feet below the cliff
formation (T. 108). It is therefore apparent that the
plaintiffs themselves recognized that no reasonable and
prudent person would be able to fly over the claims unless they were described as being on top of and below
the cliff. Yet when the claims were described in the notice
of location, they were described as being "on top" of the
Wingate formation, and certainly the location notices
preclude any assertion that the claims on the ground
are L-sha ped. The dimensions shown in the original
notices allow only for claims in the shape of a rectangle
or parallelogram. The-re is absolutely nothing whatever
to indicate angular sidelines. The descriptions required
to describe claims having angular side lines can be obse-rved in the amended Hi Boy location notices. (Plain-
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tiffs' Exhibits K, L, and l\1) Where the plaintiffs have
filed location certificates describing claims as (1) being
in Red Canyon, (2) on top of the Wingate, and (3) in the
shape of a rectangle or parallelogram, the location certificate is totally invalid when the claims for which the
certificates are record notice are (1) not in Red Canyon,
(2) are not "on top" of the Wingate and (3) are "L"shaped.
(C)

THE LOCATORS OF THE HI BOY CLAIMS
NEVER MADE A DISCOVERY OF MINERAL
IN PLACE ON THE PREMISES COVERED BY
THE SAID CLAIMS.

1

It is a fundamental statutory requirement that there
must be a discovery of mineral within the limits of any
claim located if there is to be a valid mining location.
30, U.S.C.A., Sec. 23

". . . no location of a m1n1ng claim shall be
made until the discovery of the vein or lode within
the limits of the claim located."

Sec. 40-1-1, U.C.A., 1953
"No location of the m1n1ng claims shall be
made until the discovery of the vein or lode within
the limits of the claim located."
Without a discovery there can be no rights acquired.
"Hence, in the mining laws of all civilized
countries the great consideration for granting
mines to individuals is discovery.
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". . . there can be no valid appropriation of
lode claim unless there has been an antecedent discovery. 'No location of a mining claim shall be
made until the discovery of the vein or lode within
the limits of the claim located.'

* * *''
"A location can rest only upon an actual discovery of the vein or lode.

* * *
"Discovery of mineral is the initial fact.
Without that no rights can be acquired. In litigation arising out of conflicting locations parties
may stipulate that the lands are mineral lands,
but this does not dispense with proof of discovery.
Such discovery must precede the location, or be
in advance of intervening rights. The proof of
recording and marking a claim will not authorize
the court to presume a discovery.

* * *
"If no discovery is made until after the acts
of location have been performed, the location will
date from the time of discovery." Vol. 2, L~ndley
on Mines, 3rd Ed., Sec. 335.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has spoken
on the requirements of discovery. Said the court in Gibbons v. Frazier, 68 Utah 182, 2-±9 P. 472.
"As applied to the location in question, there
were at least two essential facts required by Rev.
St. U.S. Sees. 2320, 23:2-± (U.S. Comp. St., Sees.
4615, 4620), viz : (1) The discovery of mineral
within the claim; and (2) the marking of the loca-
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tion on the ground so that its boundaries may be
readily traced. Lindley on Mines, Sec. 328. Until
the requirements of law are complied with, a location is not perfected. The decisive question in this
case is whether the record establishes the fact of
a valid location of the plaintiffs' mining claim,
and, if so, as of what time."
In the recent case of Rttmmell v. BaiJley, 7 Utah (2d)
137, 320 P. (2d) 653, 656, the Supreme Court of Utah considered what constituted a valid discovery but made it
clear that there must be something more than mere traces
or slight indications of ore.
"Nor are we disposed to disagree with the authorities to the effect that there must be something more than mere traces or slight indications
of ore which might give rise to speculation or conjecture that mineral in commercial quantities
may there exist."
The requirement of discovery as a prerequisite to a
valid location is everywhere recognized and thoroughly
settled.
Hagan v. Dutton, 181 P. 580 (Ariz., 1919)

"That discovery of mineral within the limits
of the mining claim located is a necessary prerequisite to a complete and valid mining location
is thoroughly settled by a long line of decisions.
The rule is well known to any one at all familiar
with mining law. 2 Lindley on Mines (3d Ed.)
par. 335, and cases cited in note."
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And in a rather recent case the Supreme Court of
Arizona has reiterated the rule.
Ponton v. House} 256 P. (2d) 246 (Ariz., 1953)

"This court pointed out in Brethour v. Clark,
31 Ariz. 24, 250 P. 254, that 'It is of course the
law that a mining location is based wholly upon
a discovery of mineral, and until such discovery
is made no rights are conferred by the performance of any of the other steps requisite for location. Col. v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286, 40 S. Ct. 321, 64
L. Ed. 567; Butte & S. Co. v. Clark-Mont. Co.,
249 U.S. 12, 39 S. Ct. 231, 63 L. Ed. 447; Creede
[& Cripple Creek etc.] Co. v. Uinta [Tunnel Min.
etc.] Co., 196 U.S. 337, 25 S. Ct. 266,49 L. Ed. 501'
and in Zeiger v. Dowdy, 13 Ariz. 331, 114 P. 565,
566 it was held that 'It is essential to the validity
of a mining claim that the ground be mineral in
character, and that a discovery of mineral within
the confines of the claim be made.' "
There has been no change in the rule that mere hope
and expectation of finding ore cannot avail to supplant
the required disclosure of ore in fact. Antbergris M. Co.
v. Day, 85 P. 109 (Ida.1906). All the Aliens ever had was
a speculative hope. No discovery was ever made by them
on the premises in question.
The Aliens do claim to have found some copper rock
in the area covered by the Hi Boy claims (T. 49, 65, 68,
96, 200, 201). The conclusion that the greenish colored
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material on the area in question contained copper was
completely without foundation. Dean Allen had never
done any copper mining, had no experience as a geologist,
had never worked with a cornpany that handled copper,
and was completely lacking in any training that would
permit him to detect copper mineralization (T. 78). As ~l
matter of fact, he stated that at the time the claims were
·located he had no interest in copper (T. 79) and even
had he in fact seen copper, he stated specifically that he
didn't seen enough there to cause him to want to pursue
the recovery of copper (T. 79). It is patently apparent
that the Aliens, having failed to make any discovery
whatsoever, are grasping at straws in claiming that their
observation of greenish colored material on the disputed
area constituted a discovery. Dean Allen claimed at the
trial that a person in the employment of the Holly Sugar
Company had run some tests about six or eight weeks
before the trial (T. 98). Even if he were telling the truth
in this regard, it is apparent that the plaintiffs were not
very excited about the presence of copper, having waited
nearly five years to have a test made. No evidence whatsoever of the results of this test were produced at the
trial. If there were such a test the inference is that the
results were negative. On the other hand, Professor
Norman C. Williams of the University of Utah testified
that he had been over the area in question and found no
indication at all of any copper mineralization (T. 238).
He did see a greenish colored material which he stated
was ferric oxide (T. 239). It contained no copper (T.
239). The testimony of Dr. Williams was confirmed by
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that of Arthur E. Flint (T. 401) whose qualifications as
a geologist were admitted by the plaintiffs (T. 398).

When the claims were allegedly located by the
Allens, they used neither a ~scintillator nor a geiger
counter (T. 66, 67). The plaintiff's only basis for claiming discovery on the Hi Boys was the observation of
greenish colored material on the claims and the allegedly
significant radiometric readings on an instrument used
by Nate Knight of Moab, Utah, who testified that he flew
over the area in question with a machine supposedly
capable of picking up radiation and detecting the presence of uranium (T. 102-104). However, on cross examination he testified that he did not see any of the
corners to the Hi Boy claims from the air (T. 108); that
they flew about 100 feet above the ground and 140 miles
per hour; that even if he had looked for the corners of Hi
Boy claims he couldn't have seen them (T. 111); that he
couldn't tell precisely which Hi Boy claim he might have
been over when he got a reading (T. 112); that as a
matter of fact, he couldn't be sure that when he got a
reading that he was even over a Hi Boy claim (T. 112);
and that when he got a reading he couldn't be positive of
ore content (T. 110). As a matter of fact, the instrument
used by Knight was neither a scintillator nor a geiger
counter, but called, by Mr. Knight, a "hootin-pecker"
(T. 107), and was torn up and made into an oil finding
instrument (T. 113). Obviously Mr. Knight made no discovery upon which the plaintiffs can rely.
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The greenish colored material turning out to be
something of no significance whatsoever, and the failure
to establish any discovery of mineral on the claims by
Nate Knight, leaves the plaintiffs entirely without any
discovery. The defendants insist that this alone is enough
to defeat the plaintiffs in this case. The plaintiffs have
not established a discovery of mineral on one of their
Hi Boy claims.

SUMMARY

The trial court which listened to three days of trial
of the issues in this case and received extensive briefs
from the parties concerned and had available a transcript
of the proceedings, found every issue in this case in
favor of the defendants. The defendants contend that
the evidence was sufficient to support all of the findings
and conclusions made by the trial court. The evidence
shows conclusively that Fat Dog claims Nos. 3, 4, and 5
were validly located in May, 1954; that they were prior
in time to any I-Ii Boy claims; that not one of the Hi Boy
claims is valid for the reasons enumerated herein; and
that Fat Dog Fractional claims Nos. 2 and 3 and Fat Dog
claim No. 6 were validly located in May, 1956. To the
extent there is any conflict between the Fat Dog Fractional claims Nos. 2 and 3 and Fat Dog claim No. 6 on
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the one hand and the Hi Boy claims on the other hand,
the conflict should be resolved in favor of the Fat Dog
claims again for the reasons that the Hi Boy claims were
never validly located.

As for the matter of possession the record is clear
that the plaintiffs had none nor any right thereto. The
defendants were in possession; therefore, the plaintiffs
are in no position to attack the Fat Dog or Fat Dog Fractional claims in any respect. They must prevail on the
strength of their own title. They have none.

The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

McKAY AND BURTON and
MA.COY A.. McMURRAY
Attorneys for Radium King
Mines, Inc., a Colorado Corporation; ffia U raniurn, Inc., a Colorado Corporation, et al.
720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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